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This paper analyzes the impact of tenure insecurity on the
adoption of soil conservation measures in Malawi. Soil ero-
sion is one of the principal causes of environmental degrada-
tion in Malawi and has been increasing due to population
pressure, deforestation, and unsustainable agricultural prac-
tices. Malawi has experienced higher erosion rates; about
40% of the agricultural land considered in this study is subject
to some levels of erosion, compared to other sub-Saharan
African countries with similar levels of population density
due to its speciﬁc topography (Drechsel, Gyiele, Kunze, &
Coﬁe, 2001). Soil erosion has important consequences for agri-
culture and other economic sectors thereby threatening food
security as well as downstream activities such as hydroelectric
power generation and drinking water treatment services.
Soil erosion rates have been found to be signiﬁcantly associ-
ated to climate change (O’Neal, Nearing, Vining, South worth,
& Pfeifere, 2005). Soil conservation investment can, therefore,
be considered an important climate change adaptation tool
(Deressa, Hassan, Ringler, Alemu, & Yesuf, 2009) for farmers
in Malawi. Moreover, because smallholders in Malawi are
moving toward monoculture maize systems, this introduces
an important trade-oﬀ between the economic beneﬁts of spe-
cialization and maintaining soil quality in the face of
weather-related agricultural risks (Chibwana, Fisher, &
Shively, 2012). Adopting soil conversation measures is, there-
fore, crucial to guarantee the sustainability of such widespread
agricultural practices.
Despite several government campaigns to promote soil and
water conservation practices during the mid-1990s and the
implementation of the National Environmental Policy in
1996, the extent of adoption of soil conservation measures is
not yet satisfactory. More than 30% of the plots showing a
high degree of erosion do not report any conservation mea-
sures. This paper provides new insights into why soil conserva-
tion measures are under-utilized with a focus on land tenure
insecurity.
Most of the land in Malawi is under customary law. While
use rights are well established, there is no formal market
for land. Land is transferred through allocations by village219headmen or, more predominantly nowadays, through inheri-
tance. Given the increasing demand for land, an informal
rental market has emerged and is expanding. Initially started
as a form of land borrowing between relatives, it has evolved
over the past 20 years into one-season-long informal renting
agreements mostly between non-relatives (Peters, 2010). Land
transfers through inheritance are governed by customary
tenure systems that vary across villages and are based on a
mixture of marriage and residency customary practices. In
the south, for example, the dominant system is matrilineal–
matrilocal where the husband moves to the wife’s village and
does not retain property rights on the land after death of the
partner or divorce. The ultimate owners of the land are, there-
fore, the spouse’s relatives. The northern part of the country
mainly adopts a patrilineal–patrilocal system that applies
similar principles to wives. The gender-biased nature of these
inheritance systems and the short-term nature of tenancy
contracts constitute sources of tenure insecurity and are the
focus of this paper.
Empirical analyses of the eﬀects of land tenure insecurity on
investment have produced varying results, in particular for
sub-Saharan Africa (Deininger & Jin, 2006). While tenure
insecurity is expected to decrease investment, investment itself
could lead to higher tenure security if it can be claimed by the
land user (Besley, 1995). Which mechanism prevails depends
on the type of investment and on the nature of tenure insecu-
rity. The lack of generalizable results, therefore, calls for in-
depth empirical investigations that take into account the local
social, political, and economic circumstances and the speciﬁc
sources of tenure insecurity and types of investment. This
paper focuses on marriage and inheritance practices whose
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the economic literature (Berge, Kambewa, Munthali, & Wiig,
2014).
In particular, no existing empirical studies have focused on
the eﬀect of tenure insecurity on soil conservation investment
in Malawi. Although Place and Otsuka’s (2001b) research
touches upon investment in terracing and water management
structures, their results are inconclusive and the authors call
for further research on the topic. This paper contributes to
the literature by using a large plot-household-level dataset
and employing an empirical strategy that takes advantage of
the variation in tenure security across plots belonging to the
same household. This approach oﬀers an advantage over
many of the existing empirical studies, often constrained by
small sample sizes and limited geographical coverage, since it
allows controlling for household-level unobserved heterogene-
ity using household ﬁxed eﬀects. The eﬀects of tenure insecu-
rity on erosion control investment are then compared to
those on investment in trees and on the adoption of hybrid
seeds. The comparison serves as robustness check since both
production choices share some similarities but also show some
diﬀerences with the adoption of conservation measures. Trees
produce long-term beneﬁts but, unlike conservation measures,
exhibit stronger security-enhancing properties as they can
mark a plot’s boundaries in case of disputes. Therefore, we
expect tenure insecurity to have a smaller (or even positive)
eﬀect on tree planting than on soil conservation investment.
Hybrid seeds, instead, produce mostly short-term beneﬁts
and do not exhibit security-enhancing properties. We expect,
therefore, tenure insecurity to not have a negative eﬀect on
the adoption of hybrid seeds since they do not produce
long-term beneﬁts that can potentially be expropriated by
the ultimate owner of the land in case of end-of-contract for
rented plots and death of the spouse or divorce for inherited
plots.
Various failed attempts to implement a land reform in
Malawi have put a new land policy high on the agenda of
the Malawian government. The analysis presented in this
paper can provide important insights for the development of
the land reform process. In particular, it will shed light on
the role of the land rental market, which was ignored by pre-
vious land reform attempts, and indicate whether additional
interventions or compensation measures should be introduced
together with land titling to sustain conservation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
describes the customary land tenure inMalawi. This is followed
by a description of the existing empirical evidence on the rela-
tion between tenure insecurity and land-related investment.
By reviewing the literature, the section provides the theoretical
framework underpinning the empirical analysis presented in the
paper. Section 3 presents the econometric approach, while
Section 4 provides a description of the plot-household-level
data used in the analysis. The results pertaining to the impact
of tenure insecurity on soil conservation investment and other
production choices are discussed in Section 5. Finally, the con-
clusions and policy implications are presented.2. TENURE INSECURITY IN MALAWI
Most of the land in Malawi is under a traditional customary
land system where cultivation rights are granted by traditional
leaders. Nowadays, however, only a small proportion of plots
are allocated by village headmen and most land is transferred
through inheritance (Peters & Kambewa, 2007). A new land
policy was formulated in 2002, mainly to allow farmers to reg-ister their customary land as private property. The necessary
legislative changes needed to make the policy operational,
however, were not implemented and the reform process came
to a halt. The question of land reform, therefore, remains high
on the agenda of the Malawian government and has been sub-
ject to extensive public debate. In particular, major debates
have focused on inheritance laws and the need to address
the concerns of both owners and tenants in the rapidly
expanding informal rental market (Peters, 2010).
These latter pressing issues are the main focus of the present
study. Although the lack of ownership rights is an important
source of concern, individual use rights over agricultural land
are well-established (Place & Otsuka, 2001a).The country’s
constitution prohibits arbitrary land deprivations of farmers
and when land is required for public use the government
should provide adequate notiﬁcation and compensation. 1
Therefore, the absence of legal titles is unlikely to constitute
a major impediment to investment unless it prevents house-
hold from accessing the credit market, which will not be con-
sidered in this paper. A major concern is, instead, the absence
of legal forms of land transfer. Although land can only be oﬃ-
cially transferred through inheritance, an informal rental mar-
ket has emerged and has been in continuous expansion in
response to the increasing scarcity of land (Holden, Otsuka,
& Place, 2008). The informal rental market is, however, dom-
inated by short-term (one season) contracts that introduce
uncertainty about future renewals and can prevent the adop-
tion of soil conservation measures due to the fear that the
investment and maintenance eﬀort will be expropriated by
the landlord.
Tenure insecurity is also caused by the presence of gender-
biased inheritance systems. There are diﬀerent customary
tenure systems in Malawi that are based on two main descen-
dant practices: matrilineal and patrilineal, and residency prac-
tices: matrilocal, patrilocal and neolocal. In Malawi, marriage
is almost ubiquitous and the customary system in place deter-
mines residency and inheritance. To better understand land
tenure it is important to consider both inheritance and resi-
dency practices. In a matrilineal–matrilocal system, the hus-
band moves to the wife’s village and cultivates the land that
his wife inherited from her relatives (such as her parents or
an uncle). In a patrilineal–patrilocal system the wife moves to
the husband’s village who has inherited the land from his rela-
tives so that a family is an integral part of the husband’s lin-
eage. Divorce or death of a spouse under these two practices
eﬀectively renders the non-local partner landless and he/she
will have to return to the village of origin without any form
of compensation for the investment made into the land. In par-
ticular, in case of death the land will return to the relatives of
the local deceased person (usually a brother or uncle). Berge
et al. (2014) found that the belief in the rights of the lineage
is strong in both matrilineal and patrilineal villages. Moreover,
due to increasing land scarcity, evictions of non-lineage resi-
dents are becoming more frequent. For men in matrilineal
households, for example, the most basic form of security is pro-
vided by stable marital relations (Kishindo, 2010). It is worth
noting that the probability of divorce in Malawi is among
the highest within sub-Saharan Africa countries with almost
half of all ﬁrst marriages ending in divorce within 20 years
(Reniers, 2003). This is combined with a high prevalence of
HIV/AIDS among the adult population. Moreover, because
land might be bequeathed from uncle to nephew, bypassing
the children, customary inheritance practices provide addi-
tional disincentives for investment with longer term beneﬁts.
The matrilineal–matrilocal (or Chikamwini) system is prac-
ticed mainly by three large tribes: Chewa, Lomwe and Yao,
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the south of the country. In this part of the country, a man is
said to be expected to ‘‘leave with his blanket”, meaning that
he cannot claim any material goods from the household after a
divorce or death of the spouse (Reniers, 2003). Due to increas-
ing land scarcity in Chikamwini villages, however, the system
is slowly being replaced by the matrilineal–patrilocal system
(Chitengwa). In these villages and in matrilineal–neolocal vil-
lages, a male land-user is not very secure because women are
expected to own the land; however he may opt to invest more
in order to be able to claim ownership of the land in the future
(Lunduka, 2009). In the north of the country, instead, the
most common practice is the patrilineal–patrilocal system
where the land is received through the father’s side and cou-
ples live in the husband’s village.
(a) Tenure insecurity and land-related investment
The relationship between tenure insecurity and land-related
investment has been widely studied in the literature (Place,
2009). The sources of tenure security considered range from
lack of land titles (Bezabih, Holden, & Mannberg, 2012),
short-term tenancy contracts (Bandiera, 2007), lack of trans-
ferability (Besley, 1995) and risk of expropriation (Deininger
& Jin, 2006). Fewer studies have considered the relationship
between tenure insecurity and investments in soil conservation
(Gebremedhin & Swinton, 2003). Ali, Deininger, and
Goldstein (2011), for example, ﬁnd that the implementation
of the land regularization program in Rwanda has notably
increased investment in soil conservation in particular for
women. Similarly, Holden, Deininger, and Ghebru (2009)
show that the Ethiopian low-cost land certiﬁcation program
had a positive impact on investment and maintenance of soil
conservation structures. In general, however, the results have
been mixed, in particular for sub-Saharan Africa. While tenure
security can positively aﬀect investment by ensuring longer
term stability or favouring access to credit (Besley,
Burchardi, & Ghatak, 2012), empirical studies have also found
that land-related investments can enhance security and there-
fore suggest a causal relationship that works in the opposite
direction (Brasselle, Gaspart, & Platteau, 2002). Underinvest-
ment in conservation measures has also been linked to other
aspects such as pervasive market imperfections, for example
liquidity and subsistence constraints, poverty, and high rates
of time preference (Shiferaw & Holden, 1999).
Deininger and Jin (2006) summarize the major diﬃculties
encountered by most empirical studies. Many studies, for
example, rely on small samples with limited geographical rep-
resentativeness. Of major concern are the diﬃculties in dis-
cerning the security-enhancing properties of investment from
the negative eﬀect of insecurity on productivity-enhancing
investments. The authors employ a theoretical model where
investment can potentially have both properties. The solutions
of the model predict that when tenure security is exogenous,
insecurity has a negative eﬀect on investment (pure
productivity-enhancement mechanism). On the other hand,
when tenure security is increased by investment and invest-
ment does not enhance productivity, tenure insecurity will lead
to more investment (pure security-enhancing mechanism).
Finally, when an investment exhibits both properties, the
impact of tenure security is ambiguous (mixed mechanism).
In Malawi, investment in soil conservation can, in principle,
exhibit both properties. Soil conservation measures can help
preserve soil nutrients and prevent productivity losses in the
future (productivity-enhancing mechanism). On the other
hand, conservation investment could help consolidate thetenure security of land-users. This is more likely to occur if
tenants’ good farming practices increase the chances of con-
tract renewals. This is, on the other hand, less likely to occur
in the case of strictly gender-biased inheritance customary
rules, commonly adopted in the south and north of the coun-
try that are likely to be unaﬀected by the actions of the land-
user, but more likely to aﬀect land-users in mixed-systems
where investment can potentially enhance security. Whether
the security-enhancing eﬀect prevails over the other depends
on the source of tenure insecurity and will be investigated
below.
Previous studies on the relationship between tenure insecu-
rity and investment in Malawi have found some mixed eﬀects.
Place and Otsuka (2001b), for example, ﬁnd that the invest-
ment incentives provided by the matrilineal–matrilocal tenure
arrangement are generally weaker than those in tenure systems
where patrilineal descent patterns prevail. The study focuses
mainly on the adoption and extension of tobacco production.
The study does not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative relationship
between tenure-insecurity and terracing or water managing.
As suggested by the authors, however, the results are likely
to be inﬂuenced by the lack of controls for plot-speciﬁc char-
acteristics and the small sample size. Lunduka (2009) ﬁnds
that households in matrilocal villages tend to underinvest in
tree planting. On the other hand, households in matrilineal–
neolocal villages are found to invest more suggesting that in
these systems investment in trees can help increase security
in the future. Finally, a study by Place and Otsuka (2001a)
explores the relationship between customary land tenure and
natural resource management. Using data from 57 communi-
ties, the authors do not ﬁnd evidence for a relationship
between tenure insecurity and the long-term management of
woodland. The analysis presented below contributes to this lit-
erature by focusing on another form of resource management,
soil conservation, and by exploiting a larger and more compre-
hensive sample of households across the entire country.3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
The eﬀect of tenure insecurity on the adoption of soil con-
servation measures is analyzed by estimating the following
equation:
invij ¼ aþ bdij þ czij þ dxi þ eij ð1Þ
The dependent variable, invij is a binary variable and indi-
cates the presence of soil conservation measures on plot j
belonging to household i. Tenure insecurity variables are indi-
cated by the vector dij. They are all binary variables that indi-
cate diﬀerent levels of tenure security. In the ﬁrst set of
regressions these binary indicators represent diﬀerent methods
of land acquisition (allocated, inherited, purchased, and rented
land) while in the second part of the analysis they indicate dif-
ferent levels of tenure insecurity depending on the gender of
the decision maker and the inheritance system in place in the
community. In particular, male decision makers are classiﬁed
into three diﬀerent levels of security. The most secure male
decision makers are those living in a patrilineal–patrilocal sys-
tem (category a), while the most insecure are those that moved
to a matrilineal–matrilocal village because of marriage (cate-
gory c). Finally, a third category includes male decision mak-
ers residing in other mixed systems (matrilineal–patrilocal and
matrilineal–neolocal) including those living in matrilineal–
matrilocal villages but that did not move there because of mar-
riage (category b). Female decision makers are categorized
only into two levels of security. 2 Women are considered to
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(category d) while all other female decision makers are
grouped into one less secure category (category e). It should
be noted, however, that land transactions do not necessarily
follow these idealized models of customary land tenure. Actual
transactions are likely to be more complex and ﬂexible than
these generalized rules, which, however, oﬀer a reasonable
proxy for the most common customary practice in a village
(Takane, 2008).
All speciﬁcations include a constant a, district dummies, and
a dummy indicating whether the household is located in the
lower Shiver valley where soil condition tend to be adverse
to the use of soil conservation measures. 3 The vectors xi
and zij contain the household and plot-level variables
described below, while eij is the error term which is assumed
to be normally distributed.
Although the survey oﬀers a rich set of household and plot
characteristics, these might not account for all the unobserv-
able characteristics that may be associated with tenure insecu-
rity. To address this concern, the speciﬁcation above is also
estimated including household ﬁxed eﬀects, bi, i.e., by compar-
ing plots belonging to the same household:
invij ¼ aþ bdij þ czij þ bi þ eij ð2Þ
This is possible given the large sample size provided by the
survey and the variability of tenure insecurity across a house-
hold’s plots, which are features that are seldom available in
other studies (Holden et al., 2009; Place & Otsuka, 2001b).
The main advantage of the latter speciﬁcation is that estimates
do not suﬀer from selection bias on household-level unobserv-
ables. On the other hand, by deﬁnition, it is not possible to
analyze the impact of household-level characteristics on
investment decisions. Moreover, the sub-sample of households
included in the ﬁxed eﬀects estimations, i.e., those with multi-
ple plots and diﬀerent levels of tenure insecurity, might diﬀer
from the excluded ones under particular characteristics that
will be discussed in the next sections.
All speciﬁcations are estimated using a linear probability
model. Despite the binary nature of the dependent variable,
a linear probability model is preferred because the inclusionTable 1. Average household characte
Method of acquisition Total Allocate
Soil conservation (%) 41.4 39.6
(49.3) (48.9)
Age* 43.2 49.3
(16.0) (16.9)
Education (years)* 5.2 4.7
(4.0) (4.0)
Household size 4.9 4.9
(2.2) (2.4)
Plot size (hectares) 0.4 0.4
(0.3) (0.4)
Number of plots 2.5 2.5
(1.2) (1.2)
Distance to population center (in km) 39 41.8
(20.8) (21.4)
Steep (%) 2.9 7.7
(16.9) (26.6)
Consumption per capita (in MK) 51,130 48,633
(51,520.6) (48,647.
Observations 17,267 2,051
Author’s calculations from the LSMS-ISA survey. The table reports mean va
*Refers to the decision maker.of household ﬁxed eﬀects does not bias the estimates
(Bandiera, 2007). Linear probability models provide good
estimates of the partial eﬀects for average values of the
explanatory variables and the coeﬃcients allow for a straight-
forward interpretation of the eﬀects (Wooldridge, 2002).
Measurement errors also cause a smaller bias in linear models
than in discrete choice models. Because the residuals of a lin-
ear probability model are heteroskedastic by deﬁnition, all
estimations report robust standard errors.4. DATA
The empirical analysis uses plot-household-level data pro-
vided by the third Agricultural Integrated Household Living
Standard (LSMS-ISA) survey that was conducted in 2010 by
the Government of Malawi through the National Statistical
Oﬃce. The survey collects information on more than 9,000
households across the entire country. The survey data have
been geocoded. However, to protect the conﬁdentiality of
the sampled households and communities, the geographical
positioning system (GPS) coordinates were averaged at the
enumeration area (EA) level. An EA comprises, on average,
around 200 households. All geographical characteristics,
therefore, are provided at this level of aggregation and include
average rainfall precipitations, maximum and minimum tem-
peratures, elevation, distance from the population center,
majority of land cover class and terrain roughness. The survey
also provides a rich set of plot-speciﬁc information that can
help control for plot-level heterogeneity. Variables include
plot size, soil quality (farmer’s opinion), soil type (clay or
sandy), distance of the plot from the household, slope and
whether the plot is in a wetland. The majority of the house-
holds in the sample have access to more than one plot (2 on
average) and the average plot size is 0.4 hectares (plot size
was measured using the GPS technology).
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics for the diﬀerent
methods of land acquisition. Most households in the sample
have acquired land through inheritance (78%). The smaller
share of households that was allocated land by local leadersristics by land acquisition method
d Inherited Purchased Short-term tenancy
42.4 42.7 33.4
(49.4) (49.5) (47.2)
42.5 44.8 39.6
(15.9) (14.4) (12.6)
5 6.1 7
(3.8) (4.3) (4.6)
4.9 5.4 5.3
(2.2) (2.4) (2.2)
0.4 0.5 0.4
(0.3) (0.5) (0.3)
2.5 2.4 2.4
(1.2) (1.2) (1.3)
39.3 36.2 32.6
(20.5) (20.7) (21.2)
2.4 1.8 1.2
(15.4) (13.5) (10.7)
48,827 79,550 69,584
9) (40,064.9) (15,7860.6) (71,975.0)
13,515 487 1,214
lues, standard deviations are in parenthesis.
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only 7% of the plots in the entire sample were acquired
through an informal rental market, this form of acquisition
is likely to become a more popular way to reallocate land from
land-rich households to those demanding access to land. Con-
tracts are short-term, usually for one season, and might
involve a monetary and/or an in kind payment.
Encouraged by several government campaigns, farmers have
adopt a range of soil management measures that include the
planting of vetiver grass (Vetiveria zizanioides/Vetiveria nigri-
tana) and the construction of soil bunds, contour box ridges
and terraces. Vetiver grass is planted on contour lines to form
a thin but dense hedge line to control runoﬀ and improves
moisture retention. Soil bunds are ridges and ditches made
of soil across the slope and along the contour. Box ridges or
tied ridges are made across the furrows from one crop ridge
to the next and are spaced approximately every 2 m; they help
crop ridges inﬁltrate more water into the soil (Government of
Malawi, 1995). Soil conservation is practiced by about 40% of
the households in the sample. Unfortunately, it is not possible
to observe whether the investment was made by the current or
previous land users. The most common measures (75%) are
soil bunds and vetiver grass. Table 1 shows that the likelihood
of adopting conservation measures is lower among rented
plots than for any other form of acquisition (the diﬀerence is
statistically signiﬁcant at 1%). Rented plots are on average clo-
ser to population centers and less likely to be located in steep
areas. Moreover, households renting plots tend to be younger,
more educated and to have higher average consumption per
capita. All diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
In deﬁning the level of tenure insecurity based on a gender-
biased inheritance system, I combined information on the gen-
der of the decision maker and on the village of residency. For
each plot the survey asks about who makes the decisions
about crop planting, use of inputs and timing and, therefore,
allows to identify the gender and other characteristics of the
decision maker. Unfortunately, the dataset does not allowTable 2. Average household charact
Tenure security Total
Secure patriline
(a)
Soil conservation (%) 40.1 44.8
(17.9) (15.4)
Age* 43.3 42.5
(16.2) (15.1)
Education (years)* 5 7.5
(3.8) (3.5)
Household size 4.9 5.5
(2.2) (2.5)
Plot size (hectares) 0.4 0.3
(0.3) (0.3)
Number of plots 2.5 2.8
(1.2) (1.3)
Distance to population center (in km) 39.7 49.3
(20.6) (25.0)
Steep (%) 3 7.5
(17.1) (26.3)
Consumption per capita (MK) 48,752.6 45,821.1
(41,049.3) (33,297.6)
Observations 16,410 2,023
Author’s calculations from the LSMS-ISA survey.
Only inherited and allocated land. The table reports mean values, standard de
*Refers to the decision maker.inferring from who the plot was inherited, as available in
Place and Otsuka (2001b) and Lunduka (2009). Nevertheless,
the community-level survey provides information on the
main inheritance system in place in the village, which
constitutes a good proxy for how most land is likely to have
been transferred. In villages with a matrilocal–matrilineal
system, for example, land is likely to have been inherited from
the wife’s relatives. The survey reports ﬁve customary mar-
riage systems: matrilineal–matrilocal, patrilineal–patrilocal,
matrilineal–neolocal, patrilineal–neolocal, and matrilineal–
patrilocal. It also contains an additional question on whether
in the village descendants are commonly traced through their
father or mother. This variable is also used to create a simpli-
ﬁed measure of tenure insecurity. Table 2 reports the descrip-
tive statistics of the main explanatory variables by levels of
tenure insecurity and considers only inherited and allocated
plots. Among secure decision makers, a higher share adopts
soil conservation measures, although the diﬀerences are not
statistically signiﬁcant. No clear pattern emerges among other
explanatory variables.5. TENURE INSECURITY AND SOIL CONSERVATION
INVESTMENT
This section presents the empirical results on the relation-
ship between investment in soil conservation and tenure inse-
curity due to short-term tenancy contracts and gender-biased
inheritance practices. It also considers additional production
choices including investment in trees and the adoption of
hybrid seeds.
(a) Short-term tenancy and soil conservation investment
The ﬁrst set of results considers how diﬀerent methods to
acquire land interact with soil conservation investments.
Table 3 reports the cross-section (OLS) and ﬁxed-eﬀectseristics by decision maker status
Man Woman
al Mixed systems Insecure Secure Less secure
(b) (c) (d) (e)
42.6 38.4 40.7 34.8
(17.2) (22.1) (18.7) (14.8)
41.5 41.2 46.8 49.5
(15.2) (15.2) (18.3) (16.9)
5.3 5.1 3.1 3.4
(3.7) (3.8) (3.5) (3.4)
5.1 5.1 4.2 4.5
(2.1) (2.0) (2.1) (2.4)
0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4
(0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
2.6 2.5 2.2 2.3
(1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.1)
38.7 37.6 34.9 43.3
(19.0) (18.5) (19.1) (23.4)
2.4 2.1 2.3 3
(15.2) (14.4) (15.0) (17.0)
50,648.5 42,711.6 49,838.9 44,127.9
(40,475.9) (34,764.4) (51,736.1) (33,311.0)
8,832 1,174 2,896 1,485
viation are in parenthesis.
224 WORLD DEVELOPMENT(FE) estimates and shows that land acquisition methods mat-
ter: households are less likely to invest in soil conservation
measures when their plot was acquired through a short-term
tenancy contract. In the cross-section speciﬁcation (column
1), the probability of investing in conservation measures is 6
percentage points (15%) lower for rented plots. This eﬀect is
relevant and is equivalent to a decrease in per capita consump-
tion of 1.6% or a reduction in plot size of 0.8 hectares. The
ﬁxed-eﬀects results show that the probability of investing in
conservation measures is 7.5 percentage points or 18% lower
for rented plots than for other plots. Because all contracts
are ﬁxed-term agreements, sharecropping is not a common
practice in Malawi (Holden et al., 2008); this eﬀect is likely
to indicate a commitment failure rather than a moral hazard
problem. (Jacoby & Mansuri, 2008). Unfortunately, given
the lack of data, it is not possible to test whether diﬀerences
in the duration of the tenancy would induce diﬀerent invest-
ment outcomes.
When considering all methods of acquisition separately (col-
umns 2, 4, and 5), the cross-section and the ﬁxed-eﬀects spec-
iﬁcations produce diﬀerent results as far as the impact of
allocated land is concerned. This can be partly attributed to
the fact that the average observed characteristics of the house-
holds in the ﬁxed-eﬀects sub-sample diﬀer from the overall
average. The sub-sample includes only households that have
multiple plots acquired through diﬀerent methods. In particu-Table 3. Linear regression analysis of the eﬀects of diﬀerent
Dep. variable: investment in conservation Cross section
(1) (2)
Short-term tenancy (dummy) 0.063***
(0.014)
Allocated (dummy) 0.064*
(0.017
Purchased (dummy) 0.075*
(0.026
Inherited (dummy) 0.063*
(0.014
Decision maker’s education (years) 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001
Household’s consumption per capita (log) 0.039*** 0.039*
(0.007) (0.007
Plot’s slope = moderate (dummy) 0.241*** 0.241*
(0.008) (0.008
Plot’s slope = steep (dummy) 0.315*** 0.315*
(0.023) (0.023
Plot size (ha) 0.050*** 0.050*
(0.012) (0.012
Max temperature (village-level) 0.003*** 0.003
(0.001) (0.001
Household ﬁxed eﬀects No No
District ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Observations 17,153 17,15
Households
The table reports the results of a linear probability model of diﬀerent land
represent marginal eﬀects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p
include the following additional (not reported) variables: soil quality (good, fa
number of plots, age, and gender of the decision maker and other village-le
majority of land cover and terrain roughness. Columns 1 and 3 compare sho
acquisition methods are considered separately and the excluded dummy is sho
variables are absorbed by household ﬁxed eﬀects and the speciﬁcation compa
aExcludes households with multiple decision makers.
bConsiders only investment in contour barriers as dependent variable.lar, about 50% of these households have access to both inher-
ited and rented plots, while about 20% have access to both
inherited and allocated plots. Households in this sub-sample
tend to have more members, greater wealth and a younger
household head. This latter diﬀerence, in particular, suggests
that household members are relatively younger and, therefore,
had been allocated land rather recently. Compared to inher-
ited land, which has been used by more than one generation,
and given the increasing scarcity of land, individuals are less
likely to perceive recently allocated land as their own property.
The last column of Table 3 considers only households that
have the same decision maker across all plots. These results
are preferred to previous ones as they deal with most of the
unobserved diﬀerences across households and decision makers
within the household. They show that allocated land also pro-
vides weaker incentives to invest in conservation measures.
There is no straightforward explanation for this diﬀerence.
One possible explanation is that, although both inherited
and allocated land fall under the customary law, inherited land
has been cultivated for longer (by at least two generations)
and, therefore, is more likely to be considered more secure.
No signiﬁcant diﬀerences are observed between purchased
and inherited land.
The dependent variable considered so far indicates the pres-
ence of at least one type of erosion control measures. There
are, however, diﬀerences among the various measuresland acquisition methods on investment in conservation
Household ﬁxed eﬀects
(3) (4) (5)a (6)b
0.075*** 0.056**
(0.023) (0.023)
** 0.025 0.054
) (0.045) (0.042)
** 0.085** 0.071*
) (0.041) (0.041)
** 0.086*** 0.083***
) (0.023) (0.023)
0.025 0.028 0.039
) (0.026) (0.026) (0.030)
**
)
** 0.231*** 0.227*** 0.235*** 0.231***
) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.048)
** 0.287** 0.298** 0.330** 0.338**
) (0.133) (0.133) (0.144) (0.153)
** 0.099** 0.094** 0.080* 0.084**
) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.039)
***
)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
No No No No
3 1,721 1,721 1,616 1,595
668 668 624 639
acquisition methods on investment in soil conservation. The coeﬃcients
< 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Cross section and household ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations
ir, poor), soil type (clay, sandy). The cross section speciﬁcations include:
vel characteristics including: rainfall, elevation, minimum temperatures,
rt-term tenancy contract with all other methods; in columns 2, 4, and 5
rt-term tenancy. In columns 3, 4, and 5, the household- and village-level
res plots within the same household.
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beneﬁts but must be renewed every crop season. Contour bar-
riers (soil bunds and vegetation) survive longer but are not
likely to deliver short-term beneﬁts. As a robustness check in
column 5 of Table 3 we consider only investment in contour
barriers. The result concerning short-term tenancy is not stat-
ically diﬀerent from previous ﬁndings.
As expected, soil conservation measures are more likely to
be found in steep or moderately steep plots that are more
prone to erosion. Larger plots are more likely to have erosion
control measures while education does not matter.
(b) Customary land tenure systems and soil conservation
investment
The results reported in Table 4 explore the relationship
between customary land tenure systems and the adoption of
soil conservation measures. The table reports both the cross-
section and the household ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates.
The results reported in the ﬁrst three columns are cross-
section estimates. The ﬁrst column shows that while a male
decision maker is more likely to invest in soil-conservation
measures than a female decision maker, this eﬀect is oﬀset
when the household resides in a village with a matrilineal
inheritance system. Column 2 considers a simpliﬁed measure
of tenure insecurity that indicates whether a male decision
maker resides in a matrilineal village or a female decision
maker resides in a patrilineal village. The results indicate that
insecure decision makers are 3.5 percentage points less likely
to invest in soil conservation measures. The eﬀect is larger
when controlling for household ﬁxed-eﬀects (column 4). Inse-
cure decision makers are on average 7.5 percentage points less
likely to adopt conservation measures. The eﬀect is compara-Table 4. Linear regression analysis of the eﬀect of insecurity due t
Dependent variable: investment in conservation C
(1)
Gender of decision maker (DM) (dummy, 1 = male) 0.075***
(0.015)
DM lives in matrilineal village (dummy) 0.097***
(0.019)
(DM: male)  (Matrilineal) 0.078***
(0.018)
Insecure man or woman (b + c + e) (dummy)
Insecure man (c) (dummy)
Man in mixed systems (b) (dummy)
Insecure woman (e) (dummy)
Household ﬁxed eﬀects No
District ﬁxed eﬀects Yes
Observations 14,803
Households
The table reports the results of a linear probability model of tenure insecurity d
The coeﬃcients represent marginal eﬀects. Robust standard errors in parenth
control variables considered in previous table. Insecure men (c) are those that m
indicates a man living in a matrilineal–patrilocal or matrilineal–neolocal villag
there because of marriage. An insecure woman (e) lives in a non-matrilineal–m
and woman. Columns 2 and 4 consider an aggregate category of insecure decisio
in columns 4 and 5 compares plots within the same household.
a Considers only investment in contour barriers as dependent variable.ble to that of having acquired the plot through a short-term
tenancy contract.
Tenure insecurity is then disaggregated into diﬀerent levels,
as described in Section 2, which are included in the cross-
section and ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations reported respectively
in columns 3 and 5. In both speciﬁcations the omitted cate-
gories are the most secure male and female decision makers
(category a and d). Column 3 shows that insecure male deci-
sion makers are 8 percentage points less likely to adopt conser-
vation measures. These results conﬁrm the ﬁndings in
Kishindo (2010) who conducted several targeted interviews
in the Kachenga Village, Balaka district and observed that
men in matrilineal-matrilocal villages are less willing to make
long-term investments. Being a male decision maker in a
mixed-system village also has a negative eﬀect but the coeﬃ-
cient is halved. The ﬁxed-eﬀects estimations (columns 4 and
5) provide much larger estimates as they are obtained by com-
paring plots with diﬀerent decision makers within the same
household. These households tend to have characteristics that
diﬀer from the average household. Moreover, the majority of
the households with multiple decision makers involve both a
female and a male decision maker (usually husband and wife),
i.e., there are no same-gender multiple-decision-maker house-
holds. These speciﬁcations, therefore, provide only cross-
gender eﬀects and de facto compare an insecure male decision
maker with a secure female decision maker or an insecure
female decision maker with a secure male decision maker.
The sample size is considerably reduced; nevertheless, the
eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant. Insecure male decision mak-
ers are again found to invest less in conservation measures
than their secure female counterparts. The marginal eﬀect,
0.24, is very large compared to the sample average of 0.48.
Furthermore, less insecure male decision makers (category b)o marriage/inheritance practises on investment in conservation
ross section Household ﬁxed eﬀects
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)a
0.037*** 0.068***
(0.009) (0.024)
0.035*** 0.075**
(0.008) (0.034)
0.080*** 0.244* 0.357*
(0.026) (0.141) (0.184)
0.036* 0.095** 0.096**
(0.021) (0.045) (0.044)
0.018 0.135** 0.103*
(0.018) (0.065) (0.059)
No No Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes No No No
15,434 15,434 335 335 308
143 143 137
ue to diﬀerent marriage/inheritance systems on investment in conservation.
eses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 All speciﬁcations include the same
oved to a matrilineal–matrilocal village because of marriage. Dummy (b)
e or a man living in a matrilineal–matrilocal village but that did not move
atrilocal village. The omitted dummies are those indicating a secure man
n makers (categories b, c, and e). The household ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations
226 WORLD DEVELOPMENTare less likely to invest but the eﬀect is again halved. Although
this conﬁrms that insecurity matters, the magnitude of these
eﬀects may not be generalized to the entire sample. Column
6 of Table 4 considers only investment in contour barriers.
The results are not statistically diﬀerent from previous ﬁnd-
ings. On the whole, the results suggest that tenure insecurity
has a negative eﬀect on soil conservation investment even in
mixed systems where a security-enhancing mechanism could
be at work.
When considering the impact of insecurity on female deci-
sion makers’ investment it is important to notice that only
27% of the female decision makers considered in the cross-
section speciﬁcations are married, the remainder is either wid-
owed or divorced. Divorced or widowed women are likely to
have returned to their village and cultivate the family’s plots
which could explain the non-negative coeﬃcient reported in
column 3. In this case, therefore, the rationale adopted before
to explain the results might not apply. However, when consid-
ering the ﬁxed-eﬀects sub-sample about 90% of the female
decision makers are married and, in almost all cases, the other
decision maker is the husband. Insecure female decision mak-
ers invest less than their secure male counterpart. While the
negative eﬀect could be inﬂated by a pure gender eﬀect, it
may also capture the much more severe ‘‘property grabbing”
by the husband’s relatives which women are often subject to
upon the death of their husband (Ligomeka, 2013). Some soil
conservation measures could be complementary to the produc-
tion model adopted by the household. Some households, for
example, could engage in agroforestry where trees are grown
among crops not for conservation purposes but for production
purposes. To isolate the eﬀect of tenure insecurity on conser-
vation rather than on other production choices, the above
speciﬁcations were applied to a sub-sample of households
that produce only maize, and no other product from
permanent or semi-permanent plantations. The results are
almost unchanged.
Finally, it is worth noting that, although a particular mar-
riage system might be predominant in a particular village,
marriages can also be negotiated on neutral grounds and
therefore using village-level information might not always pro-
vide a good measure of tenure insecurity. One potential prob-
lem could also arise if living in a village with a particular
marriage system is an endogenous individual choice. Unfortu-
nately, there is not enough information to address this prob-
lem. However, when individuals that moved to a village to
look for a job, land or to start a new business (about 500 indi-
viduals, 6% of the sample) are removed from the sample the
results remain almost unchanged.
(c) The eﬀects of tenure insecurity on investment in trees and the
adoption of hybrid seeds
The results discussed so far have shown that tenure insecu-
rity provides disincentives to adopt soil conservation mea-
sures. While these measures have the potential to increase
future productivity, they exhibit weaker security-enhancing
properties. Their adoption is discouraged by the threat of
contract non-renewal and of the loss of use rights due to a
gender-biased inheritance system even in villages with a mixed
inheritance system.
In this section, tenure insecurity is related to other produc-
tion choices with various degrees of similarity to conservation
measures. Similar to soil conservation measures, trees are
another form of land-related investment that can increase pro-
ductivity in the future but can also generate short-term proﬁts.
Growing a mix of trees and annual crops, in fact, is generallymore proﬁtable than only growing crops (Bandiera, 2007) but
trees might take several years to reach maturity. In Malawi,
boundary planting systems are popular ways of clearly deﬁne
the area of landholding. Trees, therefore, have also the poten-
tial of consolidating tenure security, in particular, in villages
with mixed-inheritance systems where, despite an unfavour-
able lineage system, the land user, who resides either in a neu-
tral village or in the village of origin, can use tree boundaries
as evidence in case of disputes (Lunduka, 2009).
The top panel of Table 5 reports the cross-section and ﬁxed
eﬀects results when the dependent variable is the probability of
growing trees. Similar to previous results, short-term tenancy
contracts provide a disincentive to grow trees. The probability
of investing in conservation measures is 2 percentage points
(20%) lower for rented plots (the sample average of the depen-
dent variable is 0.10). Inheritance-related insecurity produces
mixed eﬀects on the decision of planting trees. Considering
the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates in column 4, insecure male decision
makers in matrilineal-matrilocal villages are less likely to
invest in trees. On the other hand, the eﬀect is positive for male
decision makers in mixed systems. This latter result is in line
with the ﬁndings of Lunduka (2009) where investment in trees
in Malawi is found to be higher for those decision makers that
can consolidate their tenure security by investing in tree
boundaries. Similarly ﬁndings, although in a diﬀerent context,
are reported in Deininger and Jin (2006) where investment in
trees in Ethiopia is found to be positively correlated with
tenure insecurity as their visibility can be used to manifest
property rights. These results suggest that soil conservation
investment exhibit weaker security-enhancing properties than
investment in trees and indicate that the adoption of soil con-
servation measures is more negatively aﬀected by tenure inse-
curity than other forms of investment.
The second panel of Table 5 considers the decision of plant-
ing hybrid seeds. Hybrid seeds are in general more expensive
but have higher average yields. They do not provide long-
term beneﬁts nor can they help consolidate tenure security.
Therefore, the decision of adopting hybrid seeds is not
expected to be aﬀected by tenure insecurity in a similar way
to conservation measures. The results show that male decision
makers in mixed-system villages are more likely to plant
hybrid seeds but the eﬀect is not robust to the inclusion of
household ﬁxed eﬀects. Therefore, as expected, tenure insecu-
rity due to inheritance practices does not aﬀect the adoption of
hybrid seeds. The results also show that richer and more edu-
cated households are more likely to adopt hybrid seeds. Short-
term tenancy contracts are positively related to the use of
hybrid seeds suggesting that other mechanisms might be at
work. This is in line with the ﬁndings of Chirwa (2005). The
author suggests that rented plots are cultivated to generate
commercial returns rather than to meet household subsistence
needs and production decisions are, therefore, more heavily
driven by short-term proﬁtability concerns. However, this
eﬀect also becomes insigniﬁcant when household ﬁxed-eﬀects
are included.6. CONCLUSIONS
Soil erosion is a serious threat to the long-term sustainabil-
ity of agriculture in Malawi. Tenure insecurity in Malawi
arises from the emerging informal land rental market that only
provides short-term contracts and from the gender-biased
inheritance practices still adopted by the majority of the
population.
Table 5. Linear regression analysis of the eﬀect of tenure insecurity on investment in trees and hybrid seeds
Dependent variable: trees Acquisition methods Customary land tenure
Cross section Household Fixed eﬀects Cross section Household Fixed eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Short-term tenancy (dummy) 0.020** 0.027*
(0.008) (0.016)
Gender of decision maker (DM) (dummy, 1 = male) 0.004 0.177*** 0.020
(0.007) (0.054) (0.019)
Insecure man (c) (dummy) 0.038* 0.442**
(0.021) (0.175)
Man in mixed systems (b) (dummy) 0.008 0.074*
(0.016) (0.044)
Insecure woman (e) (dummy) 0.020 0.024
(0.014) (0.042)
Decision maker’s education (years) 0.000 0.002***
(0.000) (0.001)
Household ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes No Yes
District ﬁxed eﬀects Yes No Yes No
Observations 17,415 1,746 19,028 341
Households 669 143
Dependent variable: hybrid seeds (5) (6) (7) (8)
Short-term tenancy (dummy) 0.115*** 0.043
(0.018) (0.046)
Insecure man (c) (dummy) 0.033 0.295
(0.034) (0.381)
Man in mixed systems (b) (dummy) 0.050* 0.194
(0.028) (0.141)
Insecure woman (e) (dummy) 0.003 0.064
(0.024) (0.171)
Decision maker’s education (years) 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
Consumption per capita (log) 0.086*** 0.079***
(0.009) (0.009)
Household ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes No Yes
District ﬁxed eﬀect Yes No Yes No
Observations 12,087 1,086 10,941 220
Households 653 67
The table reports the results of a linear probability model of diﬀerent levels of tenure insecurity due to short-term tenancy and diﬀerent marriage/
inheritance systems on investment in conservation. The coeﬃcients represent marginal eﬀects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
All previously considered controls are included but not reported. Insecure men (c) are those that moved to a matrilineal–matrilocal village because of
marriage. Dummy (b) indicates a man living in a matrilineal–patrilocal or matrilineal–neolocal village or a man living in a matrilineal–matrilocal village
but that did not move there because of marriage. An insecure woman (e) lives in a non-matrilineal–matrilocal village. The omitted dummies are those
indicating a secure man and woman. The household ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations in columns 4 and 5 compare plots within the same household.
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investment in soil conversation. The probability of investing
in conservation measures is found to be around 6 percentage
points (about 14%) lower for rented plots than for inherited
and purchased plots. No diﬀerences are, instead, found with
allocated plots. Considering insecurity from unfavourable
marriage/inheritance practices, the results also indicate a rele-
vant eﬀect of tenure insecurity. Investment in conservation is
more than 8 percentage points lower for men in matrilineal-
matrilocal societies, those with highest tenure insecurity, and
more than 3.5 percentage points lower for men in mixed sys-
tems. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that overall
soil conservation investment would increase by 9 percentage
points if both sources of insecurity are tackled.
The nature of land transactions in Malawi is very complex
and the simpliﬁcation of tenure insecurity used in this paper,
which is based solely on the matrilineal/patrilineal andmatrilocal/patrilocal dichotomies, might neglect some of this
complexity. Matchaya (2009), for example, discusses how
tenure insecurity can also vary within a village depending on
the indigenous or non-indigenous status of a person’s parents.
Moreover, it would also be interesting to analyze whether a
spouse’s heir (usually a brother or uncle), who ultimately
safeguard the land, do undertake conservation investments
on the plots. Unfortunately, the available data do not allow
such extensive analysis of cross-household interactions,
nevertheless, the results are useful in raising important
concerns that are relevant for the on-going land reform
process in Malawi.
The ﬁndings of this study indicate that an eﬀective land
reform should consider introducing land rights in conjunction
with addressing the distortive role of existing customary inher-
itance/marriage practices. In the presence of gendered-bias
inheritance practices, land-related investment is discouraged
228 WORLD DEVELOPMENTsince the land user can be dispossessed of the land without
compensation by the spouse’s relatives who ultimately possess
the land. In this context, merely securing ownership rights
might not produce the desire eﬀects on investment in conserva-
tion because ownership and use still remain separate entities.
A possible solution would be ensuring inheritance rights
for children and surviving spouse in both patrilineal and
matrilineal systems. The New Land Policy proposed in 2002
pointed in this direction, but was not implemented due to
the lack of the required institutional framework (Holden,
Kaarhus, & Lunduka, 2006).
The results also suggest the need for a reform of the land
rental market that should introduce formal longer term con-tracts and more secure rights for both owners and tenants,
issues that have not been taken seriously in previous attempt
to reform the land market (Peters & Kambewa, 2007).
Gender-biased inheritance and marriage practices are in
place in various sub-Saharan African countries. In Zambia,
for example, some ethnics groups share similar customary
practices to the Chewa group in Malawi. Inheritance and mar-
riage practices vary across and within countries and have not
been suﬃciently studied in the economic literature. This study
shows the importance of acknowledging the crucial role that
such customary practices have in aﬀecting tenure security
and, consequently, the inﬂuence they have on land-related
decision making.NOTES1. The fairness of the expropriation process is also conﬁrmed in a World
Bank’s assessment of land governance in Malawi (Jere, 2014).
2. There are only few female decision makers under the most insecure
system (patrilineal–patrilocal), therefore, women in the patrilineal–
patrilocal system are considered together with those in mixed systems,
the aggregated category is labeled ‘‘less secure”.3. This is due to poor drainage in the area. Farmers in these areas are
aware that contour ridging is not a suitable practice because the reduced
inﬁltration leads to increased runoﬀ and consequently frequent ridge
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